

The President's Daily Brief

6 November 1969

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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A West German official has elaborated on his country's policy toward the East. (Page 2)

The Soviet leadership is looking to SALT for signs of US willingness to enter an era of negotiations. (Page 3)

The Lebanese Government and the fedayeen apparently reached an agreement only on broad principles in Cairo. (Page~4) Ambassador Barbour's views on possible Israeli actions against Lebanon, and our comments thereon, are offered on Page~4.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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An article in the North Vietnamese Army newspaper on 29 October describes a provincial recruitment campaign that may be part of a nationwide effort. The article is unusually explicit in linking the drive to the war in the South. It urges men to "join the army to fight the Americans" and mentions the duty of party authorities to contribute "human resources to the front line."

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WEST GERMANY - EAST GERMANY

Egon Bahr, state secretary in the chancellery and a long-time confidant of Brandt, has told US officials that the new government will begin its Eastern policy offensive by attempting to negotiate agreements renouncing the use of force with the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany in that order. He said that West Germany would require completion of such agreements before it would participate in a European security conference. He thinks the Soviets have publicly engaged their prestige in convening a conference soon, thus giving Western countries an opportunity to put forth preconditions.

In pursuing a dialogue with East Germany, Bonn hopes ultimately to negotiate an "all-German treaty," according to Bahr. The treaty would provide for a modus vivendi on the basis of the existence of two German states. Bonn would not formally recognize East Germany, nor would Allied rights in Berlin be affected.

In return for East German guarantees of West German access to Berlin, Bonn would give up its opposition to recognition of East Germany by third countries. Bahr said the measures in Bonn's program would have to be taken rapidly--perhaps within a year--lest a flood of third country recognitions undermine Bonn's negotiating position.

In outlining Bonn's plans, Bahr was very careful to assure the Allies that their interests will be protected. As with previous West German governments, the leaders of the new one apparently recognize that Washington, Paris, and London expect to be kept fully informed on East-West German developments.

Bahr seems to be saying in effect that the West Germans recognize once and for all that the burden of moving toward closer ties with East Germany is pretty much theirs alone. He senses that Bonn has some leverage with East Germany, but will have to act rapidly in order to exploit its advantage.

USSR-US

Valentin Berezhkov, the acting editor of a Soviet newsweekly, told a US Embassy official on 3 November that successful strategic arms limitations talks could lead to US-USSR cooperation in other areas. The Soviet leadership, he said, is looking to the talks for signs of US willingness to enter an era of negotiations.

Soviet diplomats at the UN have been taking this line recently in discussing the resolution on international security which Gromyko introduced in the General Assembly in September. They emphasize that Moscow expects the US attitude toward this resolution to be reflected at the arms talks.

This is an oft-tried gambit when the Soviets want the US to be more forthcoming. It often is backed up with the claim that the US will thereby strengthen the more Western-minded faction in the Kremlin. Nevertheless, these statements do mark Moscow's private acknowledgment that SALT cannot be dissociated from other matters--an acknowledgment the Soviets have been reluctant to make. Moscow in the past has often showed its annoyance at public US statements linking disarmament progress to other problems, probably in part because the Soviets are nervous about conveying the impression they are colluding with the US on matters outside the disarmament sphere. The Soviets may also believe that Washington is trying to make them appear responsible for any lack of progress on SALT.

MIDDLE EAST

The Lebanese Government and the fedayeen apparently reached an agreement only on broad principles in Cairo, press reports to the contrary. Following a meeting with President Hilu on Tuesday, caretaker Prime Minister Karami announced that both parties will soon meet in Beirut to work out the details of the Cairo agreement. There may be even further delays in arriving at a comprehensive agreement.

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Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv states his belief that:

--Israel will exercise "maximum restraint" toward the fedayeen in Lebanon in order not to complicate Lebanese problems in controlling them.

--If the Lebanese Government loses control of the fedayeen, Israel would be opposed to anything more than retaliation in kind.

--Even "if direct Syrian military intervention results in the disappearance of Lebanon as a state," the odds are strongly against the seizure of Lebanese territory by the Israelis.

From our admittedly long-distance viewpoint, we find it difficult to concur in
this prediction of Israeli restraint.

Tel Aviv does have an interest in preserving and encouraging the Christians in Lebanon and might hesitate for this reason
before retaliating. The most telling factors in Israeli calculations, however,
are the incident and casualty rates along
the frontier. The Israelis certainly
view with great disfavor what amounts to
an extension of their fighting fronts to
include Lebanon, and we find it hard indeed to believe that they will treat this
front any differently from the others
when the going gets heavy.

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Similarly, we do not think an Israeli seizure of Lebanese territory is as remote a possibility as Ambassador Barbour suggests. It would certainly take a major incident on the other side to trigger such a seizure, and we do not think the fedayeen by themselves could provoke it. A Syrian takeover, however, could very easily do so.

Moreover, it would not be beyond the capacity of the Lebanese Christians, if they thought their position in the country were deteriorating seriously, to try to stimulate an Israeli intervention by various direct and indirect means.

CHILE

General Rene Schneider, who was named commander of the Chilean Army after last month's uprising,

on Sunday that he thinks

Senator Salvador Allende will win next year's presidential election. He says he would accept an Allende government. Schneider termed 73-year-old Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the conservatives, a "has-been" and said there would be another military rebellion if he were elected. Nor, he asserted, would the army accept Jacques Chonchol, a radical leftist who is vying with Allende for leftist and Communist support. (Most observers agree that the main contenders will be Radomiro Tomic of President Frei's Christian Democrats and Alessandri, along with the candidate of the left.)

Allende belongs to the Socialist Party, the most extreme of Chile's major leftist groups. Among his Socialist colleagues he seems relatively respectable, but he is still a fervent admirer of Fidel Castro and a good friend of the Chilean Communist Party. He also is highly popular with the Chilean electorate; in 1958, in one of his three presidential campaigns, he came in a close second to Alessandri.

General Schneider's professed willingness to accept Allende is the first indication we have seen of the way political sentiment is running in the upper ranks of the Chilean military—and the military is taking a more active interest in politics in the wake of the uprising last month.

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